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February 1, 2021

Explore AI Email Security Approaches with Darktrace

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01
Feb 2021
Stay informed on the latest AI approaches to email security. Explore Darktrace's comparisons to find the best solution for your cybersecurity needs!

Innovations in artificial intelligence (AI) have fundamentally changed the email security landscape in recent years, but it can often be hard to determine what makes one system different to the next. In reality, under that umbrella term there exists a significant distinction in approach which may determine whether the technology provides genuine protection or simply a perceived notion of defense.

One backward-looking approach involves feeding a machine thousands of emails that have already been deemed to be malicious, and training it to look for patterns in these emails in order to spot future attacks. The second approach uses an AI system to analyze the entirety of an organization’s real-world data, enabling it to establish a notion of what is ‘normal’ and then spot subtle deviations indicative of an attack.

In the below, we compare the relative merits of each approach, with special consideration to novel attacks that leverage the latest news headlines to bypass machine learning systems trained on data sets. Training a machine on previously identified ‘known bads’ is only advantageous in certain, specific contexts that don’t change over time: to recognize the intent behind an email, for example. However, an effective email security solution must also incorporate a self-learning approach that understands ‘normal’ in the context of an organization in order to identify unusual and anomalous emails and catch even the novel attacks.

Signatures – a backward-looking approach

Over the past few decades, cyber security technologies have looked to mitigate risk by preventing previously seen attacks from occurring again. In the early days, when the lifespan of a given strain of malware or the infrastructure of an attack was in the range of months and years, this method was satisfactory. But the approach inevitably results in playing catch-up with malicious actors: it always looks to the past to guide detection for the future. With decreasing lifetimes of attacks, where a domain could be used in a single email and never seen again, this historic-looking signature-based approach is now being widely replaced by more intelligent systems.

Training a machine on ‘bad’ emails

The first AI approach we often see in the wild involves harnessing an extremely large data set with thousands or millions of emails. Once these emails have come through, an AI is trained to look for common patterns in malicious emails. The system then updates its models, rules set, and blacklists based on that data.

This method certainly represents an improvement to traditional rules and signatures, but it does not escape the fact that it is still reactive, and unable to stop new attack infrastructure and new types of email attacks. It is simply automating that flawed, traditional approach – only instead of having a human update the rules and signatures, a machine is updating them instead.

Relying on this approach alone has one basic but critical flaw: it does not enable you to stop new types of attacks that it has never seen before. It accepts that there has to be a ‘patient zero’ – or first victim – in order to succeed.

The industry is beginning to acknowledge the challenges with this approach, and huge amounts of resources – both automated systems and security researchers – are being thrown into minimizing its limitations. This includes leveraging a technique called “data augmentation” that involves taking a malicious email that slipped through and generating many “training samples” using open-source text augmentation libraries to create “similar” emails – so that the machine learns not only the missed phish as ‘bad’, but several others like it – enabling it to detect future attacks that use similar wording, and fall into the same category.

But spending all this time and effort into trying to fix an unsolvable problem is like putting all your eggs in the wrong basket. Why try and fix a flawed system rather than change the game altogether? To spell out the limitations of this approach, let us look at a situation where the nature of the attack is entirely new.

The rise of ‘fearware’

When the global pandemic hit, and governments began enforcing travel bans and imposing stringent restrictions, there was undoubtedly a collective sense of fear and uncertainty. As explained previously in this blog, cyber-criminals were quick to capitalize on this, taking advantage of people’s desire for information to send out topical emails related to COVID-19 containing malware or credential-grabbing links.

These emails often spoofed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), or later on, as the economic impact of the pandemic began to take hold, the Small Business Administration (SBA). As the global situation shifted, so did attackers’ tactics. And in the process, over 130,000 new domains related to COVID-19 were purchased.

Let’s now consider how the above approach to email security might fare when faced with these new email attacks. The question becomes: how can you train a model to look out for emails containing ‘COVID-19’, when the term hasn’t even been invented yet?

And while COVID-19 is the most salient example of this, the same reasoning follows for every single novel and unexpected news cycle that attackers are leveraging in their phishing emails to evade tools using this approach – and attracting the recipient’s attention as a bonus. Moreover, if an email attack is truly targeted to your organization, it might contain bespoke and tailored news referring to a very specific thing that supervised machine learning systems could never be trained on.

This isn’t to say there’s not a time and a place in email security for looking at past attacks to set yourself up for the future. It just isn’t here.

Spotting intention

Darktrace uses this approach for one specific use which is future-proof and not prone to change over time, to analyze grammar and tone in an email in order to identify intention: asking questions like ‘does this look like an attempt at inducement? Is the sender trying to solicit some sensitive information? Is this extortion?’ By training a system on an extremely large data set collected over a period of time, you can start to understand what, for instance, inducement looks like. This then enables you to easily spot future scenarios of inducement based on a common set of characteristics.

Training a system in this way works because, unlike news cycles and the topics of phishing emails, fundamental patterns in tone and language don’t change over time. An attempt at solicitation is always an attempt at solicitation, and will always bear common characteristics.

For this reason, this approach only plays one small part of a very large engine. It gives an additional indication about the nature of the threat, but is not in itself used to determine anomalous emails.

Detecting the unknown unknowns

In addition to using the above approach to identify intention, Darktrace uses unsupervised machine learning, which starts with extracting and extrapolating thousands of data points from every email. Some of these are taken directly from the email itself, while others are only ascertainable by the above intention-type analysis. Additional insights are also gained from observing emails in the wider context of all available data across email, network and the cloud environment of the organization.

Only after having a now-significantly larger and more comprehensive set of indicators, with a more complete description of that email, can the data be fed into a topic-indifferent machine learning engine to start questioning the data in millions of ways in order to understand if it belongs, given the wider context of the typical ‘pattern of life’ for the organization. Monitoring all emails in conjunction allows the machine to establish things like:

  • Does this person usually receive ZIP files?
  • Does this supplier usually send links to Dropbox?
  • Has this sender ever logged in from China?
  • Do these recipients usually get the same emails together?

The technology identifies patterns across an entire organization and gains a continuously evolving sense of ‘self’ as the organization grows and changes. It is this innate understanding of what is and isn’t ‘normal’ that allows AI to spot the truly ‘unknown unknowns’ instead of just ‘new variations of known bads.’

This type of analysis brings an additional advantage in that it is language and topic agnostic: because it focusses on anomaly detection rather than finding specific patterns that indicate threat, it is effective regardless of whether an organization typically communicates in English, Spanish, Japanese, or any other language.

By layering both of these approaches, you can understand the intention behind an email and understand whether that email belongs given the context of normal communication. And all of this is done without ever making an assumption or having the expectation that you’ve seen this threat before.

Years in the making

It’s well established now that the legacy approach to email security has failed – and this makes it easy to see why existing recommendation engines are being applied to the cyber security space. On first glance, these solutions may be appealing to a security team, but highly targeted, truly unique spear phishing emails easily skirt these systems. They can’t be relied on to stop email threats on the first encounter, as they have a dependency on known attacks with previously seen topics, domains, and payloads.

An effective, layered AI approach takes years of research and development. There is no single mathematical model to solve the problem of determining malicious emails from benign communication. A layered approach accepts that competing mathematical models each have their own strengths and weaknesses. It autonomously determines the relative weight these models should have and weighs them against one another to produce an overall ‘anomaly score’ given as a percentage, indicating exactly how unusual a particular email is in comparison to the organization’s wider email traffic flow.

It is time for email security to well and truly drop the assumption that you can look at threats of the past to predict tomorrow’s attacks. An effective AI cyber security system can identify abnormalities with no reliance on historical attacks, enabling it to catch truly unique novel emails on the first encounter – before they land in the inbox.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Author
Dan Fein
VP, Product

Based in New York, Dan joined Darktrace’s technical team in 2015, helping customers quickly achieve a complete and granular understanding of Darktrace’s product suite. Dan has a particular focus on Darktrace/Email, ensuring that it is effectively deployed in complex digital environments, and works closely with the development, marketing, sales, and technical teams. Dan holds a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science from New York University.

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October 15, 2024

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Navigating buying and adoption journeys for AI cybersecurity tools

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Enterprise AI tools go mainstream

In this dawning Age of AI, CISOs are increasingly exploring investments in AI security tools to enhance their organizations’ capabilities. AI can help achieve productivity gains by saving time and resources, mining intelligence and insights from valuable data, and increasing knowledge sharing and collaboration.  

While investing in AI can bring immense benefits to your organization, first-time buyers of AI cybersecurity solutions may not know where to start. They will have to determine the type of tool they want, know the options available, and evaluate vendors. Research and understanding are critical to ensure purchases are worth the investment.  

Challenges of a muddied marketplace

Key challenges in AI purchasing come from consumer doubt and lack of vendor transparency. The AI software market is buzzing with hype and flashy promises, which are not necessarily going to be realized immediately. This has fostered uncertainty among potential buyers, especially in the AI cybersecurity space.  

As Gartner writes, “There is a general lack of transparency and understanding about how AI-enhanced security solutions leverage AI and the effectiveness of those solutions within real-world SecOps. This leads to trust issues among security leaders and practitioners, resulting in slower adoption of AI features” [1].  

Similarly, only 26% of security professionals report a full understanding of the different types of AI in use within security products.

Given this widespread uncertainty generated through vague hype, buyers must take extra care when considering new AI tools to adopt.  

Goals of AI adoption

Buyers should always start their journeys with objectives in mind, and a universal goal is to achieve return on investment. When organizations adopt AI, there are key aspects that will signal strong payoff. These include:  

  • Wide-ranging application across operations and areas of the business
  • Actual, enthusiastic adoption and application by the human security team  
  • Integration with the rest of the security stack and existing workflows
  • Business and operational benefits, including but not limited to:  
  • Reduced risk
  • Reduced time to response
  • Reduced potential downtime, damage, and disruption
  • Increased visibility and coverage
  • Improved SecOps workflows
  • Decreased burden on teams so they can take on more strategic tasks  

Ideally, most or all these measurements will be fulfilled. It is not enough for AI tools to benefit productivity and workflows in theory, but they must be practically implemented to provide return on investment.  

Investigation before investment

Before investing in AI tools, buyers should ask questions pertaining to each stage of the adoption journey. The answers to these questions will not only help buyers gauge if a tool could be worth the investment, but also plan how the new tool will practically fit into the organization’s existing technology and workflows.  

Figure 1: Initial questions to consider when starting to shop for AI [2].

These questions are good to imagine how a tool will fit into your organization and determine if a vendor is worth further evaluation. Once you decide a tool has potential use and feasibility in your organization, it is time to dive deeper and learn more.  

Ask vendors specific questions about their technology. This information will most likely not be on their websites, and since it involves intellectual property, it may require an NDA.  

Find a longer list of questions to ask vendors and what to look for in their responses in the white paper “CISO’s Guide to Buying AI.”

Committing to transparency amidst the AI hype

For security teams to make the most out of new AI tools, they must trust the AI. Especially in an AI marketplace full of hype and obfuscation, transparency should be baked into both the descriptions of the AI tool and the tool’s functionality itself. With that in mind, here are some specifics about what techniques make up Darktrace’s AI.  

Darktrace as an AI cybersecurity vendor

Darktrace has been using AI technology in cybersecurity for over 10 years. As a pioneer in the space, we have made innovation part of our process.  

The Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform™ uses multi-layered AI that trains on your unique business operations data for tailored security across the enterprise. This approach ensures that the strengths of one AI technique make up for the shortcomings of another, providing well-rounded and reliable coverage. Our models are always on and always learning, allowing your team to stop attacks in real time.  

The machine learning techniques used in our solution include:

  • Unsupervised machine learning
  • Multiple Clustering Techniques
  • Multiple anomaly detection models in tandem analyzing data across hundreds of metrics
  • Bayesian probabilistic methods
  • Bayesian metaclassifier for autonomous fine-tuning of unsupervised machine learning models
  • Deep learning engines
  • Graph theory
  • Applied supervised machine learning for investigative AI  
  • Neural networks
  • Reinforcement Learning
  • Generative and applied AI
  • Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Large Language Models (LLMs)
  • Post-processing models

Additionally, since Darktrace focuses on using the customer’s data across its entire digital estate, it brings a range of advantages in data privacy, interpretability, and data transfer costs.  

Building trust with Darktrace AI

Darktrace further supports the human security team’s adoption of our technology by building trust. To do that, we designed our platform to give your team visibility and control over the AI.  

Instead of functioning as a black box, our products focus on interpretability and sharing confidence levels. This includes specifying the threshold of what triggered a certain alert and the details of the AI Analyst’s investigations to see how it reached its conclusions. The interpretability of our AI uplevels and upskills the human security team with more information to drive investigations and remediation actions.  

For complete control, the human security team can modify all the detection and response thresholds for our model alerts to customize them to fit specific business preferences.  

Conclusion

CISO’s are increasingly considering investing in AI cybersecurity tools, but in this rapidly growing field, it’s not always clear what to look for.  

Buyers should first determine their goals for a new AI tool, then research possible vendors by reviewing validation and asking deeper questions. This will reveal if a tool is a good match for the organization to move forward with investment and adoption.  

As leaders in the AI cybersecurity industry, Darktrace is always ready to help you on your AI journey.  

Learn more about the most common types of machine learning in cybersecurity in the white paper “CISO’s Guide to Buying AI.”

References

  1. Gartner, April 17, 2024, “Emerging Tech: Navigating the Impact of AI on SecOps Solution Development.”  
  1. Inspired by Gartner, May 14, 2024, “Presentation Slides: AI Survey Reveals AI Security and Privacy Leads to Improved ROI” and NHS England, September, 18, 2020, “A Buyer’s Guide to AI in Health and Care,” Available at: https://transform.england.nhs.uk/ai-lab/explore-all-resources/adopt-ai/a-buyers-guide-to-ai-in-health-and-care/  
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About the author
Nicole Carignan
VP of Strategic Cyber AI

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October 16, 2024

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Inside the SOC

Triaging Triada: Understanding an Advanced Mobile Trojan and How it Targets Communication and Banking Applications

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The rise of android malware

Recently, there has been a significant increase in malware strains targeting mobile devices, with a growing number of Android-based malware families, such as banking trojans, which aim to steal sensitive banking information from organizations and individuals worldwide.

These malware families attempt to access users’ accounts to steal online banking credentials and cookies, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and conduct automatic transactions to steal funds [1]. They often masquerade as legitimate software or communications from social media platforms to compromise devices. Once installed, they use tactics such as keylogging, dumping cached credentials, and searching the file system for stored passwords to steal credentials, take over accounts, and potentially perform identity theft [1].

One recent example is the Antidot Trojan, which infects devices by disguising itself as an update page for Google Play. It establishes a command-and-control (C2) channel with a server, allowing malicious actors to execute commands and collect sensitive data [2].

Despite these malware’s ability to evade detection by standard security software, for example, by changing their code [3], Darktrace recently detected another Android malware family, Triada, communicating with a C2 server and exfiltrating data.

Triada: Background and tactics

First surfacing in 2016, Triada is a modular mobile trojan known to target banking and financial applications, as well as popular communication applications like WhatsApp, Facebook, and Google Mail [4]. It has been deployed as a backdoor on devices such as CTV boxes, smartphones, and tablets during the supply chain process [5]. Triada can also be delivered via drive-by downloads, phishing campaigns, smaller trojans like Leech, Ztorg, and Gopro, or more recently, as a malicious module in applications such as unofficial versions of WhatsApp, YoWhatsApp, and FM WhatsApp [6] [7].

How does Triada work?

Once downloaded onto a user’s device, Triada collects information about the system, such as the device’s model, OS version, SD card space, and list of installed applications, and sends this information to a C2 server. The server then responds with a configuration file containing the device’s personal identification number and settings, including the list of modules to be installed.

After a device has been successfully infected by Triada, malicious actors can monitor and intercept incoming and outgoing texts (including two-factor authentication messages), steal login credentials and credit card information from financial applications, divert in-application purchases to themselves, create fake messaging and email accounts, install additional malicious applications, infect devices with ransomware, and take control of the camera and microphone [4] [7].

For devices infected by unofficial versions of WhatsApp, which are downloaded from third-party app stores [9] and from mobile applications such as Snaptube and Vidmate , Triada collects unique device identifiers, information, and keys required for legitimate WhatsApp to work and sends them to a remote server to register the device [7] [12]. The server then responds by sending a link to the Triada payload, which is downloaded and launched. This payload will also download additional malicious modules, sign into WhatsApp accounts on the target’s phone, and request the same permissions as the legitimate WhatsApp application, such as access to SMS messages. If granted, a malicious actor can sign the user up for paid subscriptions without their knowledge. Triada then collects information about the user’s device and mobile operator and sends it to the C2 server [9] [12].

How does Triada avoid detection?

Triada evades detection by modifying the Zygote process, which serves as a template for every application in the Android OS. This enables the malware to become part of every application launched on a device [3]. It also substitutes system functions and conceals modules from the list of running processes and installed apps, ensuring that the system does not raise the alarm [3]. Additionally, as Triada connects to a C2 server on the first boot, infected devices remain compromised even after a factory reset [4].

Triada attack overview

Across multiple customer deployments, devices were observed making a large number of connections to a range of hostnames, primarily over encrypted SSL and HTTPS protocols. These hostnames had never previously been observed on the customers’ networks and appear to be algorithmically generated. Examples include “68u91.66foh90o[.]com”, “92n7au[.]uhabq9[.]com”, “9yrh7.mea5ms[.]com”, and “is5jg.3zweuj[.]com”.

External Sites Summary Graph showing the rarity of the hostname “92n7au[.]uhabq9[.]com” on a customer network.
Figure 1: External Sites Summary Graph showing the rarity of the hostname “92n7au[.]uhabq9[.]com” on a customer network.

Most of the IP addresses associated with these hostnames belong to an ASN associated with the cloud provider Alibaba (i.e., AS45102 Alibaba US Technology Co., Ltd). These connections were made over a range of high number ports over 1000, most commonly over 30000 such as 32091, which Darktrace recognized as extremely unusual for the SSL and HTTPS protocols.

Screenshot of a Model Alert Event log showing a device connecting to the endpoint “is5jg[.]3zweuj[.]com” over port 32091.
Figure 2: Screenshot of a Model Alert Event log showing a device connecting to the endpoint “is5jg[.]3zweuj[.]com” over port 32091.

On several customer deployments, devices were seen exfiltrating data to hostnames which also appeared to be algorithmically generated. This occurred via HTTP POST requests containing unusual URI strings that were made without a prior GET request, indicating that the infected device was using a hardcoded list of C2 servers.

Screenshot of a Model Alert Event Log showing the device posting the string “i8xps1” to the hostname “72zf6.rxqfd[.]com.
Figure 3: Screenshot of a Model Alert Event Log showing the device posting the string “i8xps1” to the hostname “72zf6.rxqfd[.]com.
 Screenshot of a Model Alert Event Log showing the device posting the string “sqyjyadwwq” to the hostname “9yrh7.mea5ms[.]com”.
Figure 4: Screenshot of a Model Alert Event Log showing the device posting the string “sqyjyadwwq” to the hostname “9yrh7.mea5ms[.]com”.

These connections correspond with reports that devices affected by Triada communicate with the C2 server to transmit their information and receive instructions for installing the payload.

A number of these endpoints have communicating files associated with the unofficial WhatsApp versions YoWhatsApp and FM WhatsApp [11] [12] [13] . This could indicate that the devices connecting to these endpoints were infected via malicious modules in the unofficial versions of WhatsApp, as reported by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [10] [12]. It could also mean that the infected devices are using these connections to download additional files from the C2 server, which could infect systems with additional malicious modules related to Triada.

Moreover, on certain customer deployments, shortly before or after connecting to algorithmically generated hostnames with communicating files linked to YoWhatsApp and FM WhatsApp, devices were also seen connecting to multiple endpoints associated with WhatsApp and Facebook.

Figure 5: Screenshot from a device’s event log showing connections to endpoints associated with WhatsApp shortly after it connected to “9yrh7.mea5ms[.]com”.

These surrounding connections indicate that Triada is attempting to sign in to the users’ WhatsApp accounts on their mobile devices to request permissions such as access to text messages. Additionally, Triada sends information about users’ devices and mobile operators to the C2 server.

The connections made to the algorithmically generated hostnames over SSL and HTTPS protocols, along with the HTTP POST requests, triggered multiple Darktrace models to alert. These models include those that detect connections to potentially algorithmically generated hostnames, connections over ports that are highly unusual for the protocol used, unusual connectivity over the SSL protocol, and HTTP POSTs to endpoints that Darktrace has determined to be rare for the network.

Conclusion

Recently, the use of Android-based malware families, aimed at stealing banking and login credentials, has become a popular trend among threat actors. They use this information to perform identity theft and steal funds from victims worldwide.

Across affected customers, multiple devices were observed connecting to a range of likely algorithmically generated hostnames over SSL and HTTPS protocols. These devices were also seen sending data out of the network to various hostnames via HTTP POST requests without first making a GET request. The URIs in these requests appeared to be algorithmically generated, suggesting the exfiltration of sensitive network data to multiple Triada C2 servers.

This activity highlights the sophisticated methods used by malware like Triada to evade detection and exfiltrate data. It underscores the importance of advanced security measures and anomaly-based detection systems to identify and mitigate such mobile threats, protecting sensitive information and maintaining network integrity.

Credit to: Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Security Analyst) and Charlotte Thompson (Cyber Security Analyst).

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Model Alert Coverage

Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTS to Rare Hostname

Anomalous Connections / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL

Compromise / DGA Beacon

Compromise / Domain Fluxing

Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA

Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Compromise / Unusual Connections to Rare Lets Encrypt

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

AI Analyst Incident Coverage

Unusual Repeated Connections to Multiple Endpoints

Possible SSL Command and Control

Unusual Repeated Connections

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Ioc – Type - Description

  • is5jg[.]3zweuj[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 68u91[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 9yrh7[.]mea5ms[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 92n7au[.]uhabq9[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 4a5x2[.]fs4ah[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • jmll4[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • mrswd[.]wo87sf[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • lptkw[.]s4xx6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • ya27fw[.]k6zix6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • w0g25[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • kivr8[.]wd6vy[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • iuwe64[.]ct8pc6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • qefgn[.]8z0le[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • a6y0x[.]xu0h7[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • wewjyw[.]qb6ges[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • vx9dle[.]n0qq3z[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 72zf6[.]rxqfd[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • dwq[.]fsdw4f[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • tqq6g[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 1rma1[.]4f8uq[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 0fdwa[.]7j3gj[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 5a7en[.]1e42t[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • gmcp4[.]1e42t[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • g7190[.]rt14v[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • goyvi[.]2l2wa[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • zq6kk[.]ca0qf[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • sv83k[.]bn3avv[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 9sae7h[.]ct8pc6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • jpygmk[.]qt7tqr[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • av2wg[.]rt14v[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • ugbrg[.]osz1p[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • hw2dm[.]wtws9k[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • kj9atb[.]hai8j1[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • pls9b[.]b0vb3[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8rweau[.]j7e7r[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • wkc5kn[.]j7e7r[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • v58pq[.]mpvflv[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • zmai4k[.]huqp3e[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • eajgum[.]huqp3e[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • mxl9zg[.]kv0pzv[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • ad1x7[.]mea5ms[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • ixhtb[.]s9gxw8[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • vg1ne[.]uhabq9[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • q5gd0[.]birxpk[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • dycsw[.]h99n6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • a3miu[.]h99n6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • qru62[.]5qwu8b5[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 3eox8[.]abxkoop[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 0kttj[.]bddld[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • gjhdr[.]xikuj[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • zq6kk[.]wm0hd[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.219[.]234 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.244[.]205 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.243[.]182 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.240[.]127 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.219.123[.]139 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.219.196[.]124 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.217[.]73 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.251[.]253 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.194[.]254 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.251[.]34 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.216[.]105 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 47.245.83[.]167 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 198.200.54[.]56 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 47.236.113[.]126 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 47.241.47[.]128 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • /iyuljwdhxk - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /gvuhlbzknh - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /sqyjyadwwq - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /cncyz3 - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /42k0zk - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /75kdl5 - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /i8xps1 - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /84gcjmo - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /fkhiwf - URI - Triada C2 URI

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique Name - Tactic - ID - Sub-Technique of

Data Obfuscation - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1001

Non-Standard Port - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1571

Standard Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL ICS - T0869

Non-Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1095

Masquerading - EVASION ICS - T0849

Man in the Browser - COLLECTION - T1185

Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 -T1071

External Proxy - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1090.002 - T1090

Domain Generation Algorithms - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1568.002 - T1568

Web Services - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1583.006 - T1583

DNS - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.004 - T1071

Fast Flux DNS - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1568.001 - T1568

One-Way Communication - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1102.003 - T1102

Digital Certificates - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1587.003 - T1587

References

[1] https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/cyber-security/what-is-trojan/what-is-a-banking-trojan/

[2] https://cyberfraudcentre.com/the-rise-of-the-antidot-android-banking-trojan-a-comprehensive-guide

[3] https://www.zimperium.com/glossary/banking-trojans/

[4] https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/what-is-triada-malware/

[5] https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/malware-infected-devices-retailers/

[6] https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/24926-triada-trojan-android

[7] https://securelist.com/malicious-whatsapp-mod-distributed-through-legitimate-apps/107690/

[8] https://securityboulevard.com/2024/02/impact-of-badbox-and-peachpit-malware-on-android-devices/

[9] https://threatpost.com/custom-whatsapp-build-malware/168892/

[10] https://securelist.com/triada-trojan-in-whatsapp-mod/103679/

[11] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/is5jg.3zweuj.com/relations

[12] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/92n7au.uhabq9.com/relations

[13] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/68u91.66foh90o.com/relations

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About the author
Justin Torres
Cyber Analyst
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