Blog
/
Email
/
August 2, 2024

The Rise in “Safelink Smuggling”: How to Enhance Your Resilience Against Malicious Links

Default blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
02
Aug 2024
Safelink Smuggling is not necessarily a new phenomenon, but Darktrace analysts have seen a notable increase recently. Read this blog to learn how threat actors are deploying this technique in email attacks, how vendors can mitigate Safelink Smuggling attempts, and why defense-in-depth is the solution.

Darktrace security members and researchers have recently seen a rise in what we are calling Safelink Smuggling. Safelinks are URLs rewritten by security solutions to enable additional analysis when the URL is clicked. Once analyzed, they may prompt a user, redirect the browser back to the original URL, or block further access if deemed necessary.

What is Safelink Smuggling?

Safelink Smuggling is a technique that involves an attacker purposely getting their malicious payload rewritten by a security solution’s Safelink capability to then propagate the rewritten URL to others. This technique is a way for attackers to not only avoid detection by traditional email security and other solutions, but also to instill mistrust in all email security solutions. As a result, Safelinks from a range of popular email security providers are often seen in phishing or supply chain attacks. In fact, Darktrace has observed over 300,000 cases of Safelinks being included in unexpected and suspicious contexts over the last 3 months.

How does Safelink Smuggling work?

Safelink Smuggling has two key stages: Getting a malicious link rewritten by an email security solution, then propagating that rewritten link to other victims.

Step one:

Obfuscated a malicious payload through a Safelink capability rewriting the link; Darktrace has seen this attempted through two methods – Compromised Account or Reply-Chain.

  • Method 1: Compromised Account

If an attacker can gain access to a compromised account – whether that’s through brute force, malware or credential theft – they can infiltrate it with malicious links, and then exfiltrate the Safelinks created as the email passes through security filtering. In other words, attackers will send a malicious payload to the compromised inbox, with the intent that the malicious URL gets rewritten. Unlike a normal phishing email where the threat actor wants to avoid having their email blocked, in this case the objective is for the email to get through to the inbox with the link rewritten. As observed by Darktrace, attackers often send the link in isolation as any additional components (i.e., body text or other content in the email) could cause a more severe action such as the email security solution holding the message.

  • Method 2: Reply-Chain

With this method, the attacker sends a malicious link to an email security vendor’s customer in an attempt to solicit a reply from an internal user. This allows them to grab the re-written URL within the reply chain. However, this is a risky tactic which can fail at several points. The attacker has to be confident the initial email won't be blocked outright; they also risk alerting security vendors to the address and the URL intended to be used for the main campaign. They also must be confident that the checks made when the re-written URL is clicked will not lead to a block at the final destination.
Regardless of the method used, the end result will appear as follows:

For example, the original malicious URL may look like this,

faceldu[.]org/Invoice112.zip

(negative surface indicators: recently registered domain, file extension)

And after being rewritten,

securityvevndor[.]com/safe?q=aNDF80dfaAkAH930adbd

(positive surface indicators: established domain, positive reputation, associated with safe content)

Step Two:

Now that the attacker has access to a malicious URL that has been obfuscated by a safe rewrite, attackers can forward or craft an email leveraging that same link. In fact, we have even seen multiple layers of Safelink Smuggling being used to mask a payload further.

The Challenge of Link Rewriting

Traditional email security solutions rewrite all links sent to an organization, but there is an inherent risk to this methodology. Rewriting every link, whether harmless or harmful, leads employees to lose context and creates a false sense of security when interacting with rewritten links in emails. Furthermore, it provides attackers with many opportunities to exploit Safelinks. As demonstrated in Method 2 above, if an email security solution does not rewrite every link, executing such attacks would be significantly more challenging.

Traditionally, rewriting every link made sense from a security perspective, as it allowed servers to thoroughly analyze links for known attack patterns and signatures. However, this approach relies on identifying previously recognized threats. Conversely, Darktrace / EMAIL gathers sufficient information about a link without needing to rewrite it, by analyzing the context and content of the email and the link itself.

In fact, Darktrace is the pioneer in applying selective rewriting to URLs based on suspicious properties or context, a method that other solutions have since adopted. While traditional solutions rewrite links to assess them only after they are clicked, Darktrace / EMAIL takes immediate action to neutralize threats before they reach the inbox.

Darktrace achieves high success rates in detecting malicious links and emails on the first encounter using Self-Learning AI. By understanding 'normal' behavior in email communications, Darktrace identifies subtle deviations indicative of cyber threats and selectively rewrites only those links deemed suspicious, ensuring a targeted, proportionate, and non-disruptive response.

Why do traditional email security solutions miss Safelink attacks?

Traditional security solutions that focus on learning attack patterns will miss Safelink threats as they are often utilized in attacks that have a variety of layers which help the email seem legitimate. Leveraging all the classic techniques seen in a supply chain attack to disguise the sender's intent, taking advantage of the users' inherent trust in familiar sources, the user is more likely to lower their defenses.

For more information: https://darktrace.com/products/email/use-cases/supply-chain-attack

In terms of the URL, if the payload is malicious, why is it difficult for email security solutions to catch it? Primarily, other security vendors will focus on the payload in isolation, attempting to find known attack patterns or signatures such as a domain name or IP with a bad reputation. Unfortunately, with this technique, if the URL has a legitimate domain, it will return a clean track record. Common obfuscation techniques such as captchas, short-links, and click throughs can all be deployed to add layers of complexity to the analysis.

Safelink Smuggling relies heavily on link redirects, which means that web analysis tools will falter as they will only analyze the first redirect. Consequently, when more in-depth analysis on the link itself is performed, the first place the URL takes the user is not the malicious site but rather the default on-click analysis of the vendor in question. Therefore, any traditional browser or link analysis will also return a negative result.

Finally, the context itself is important. In contrast to traditional email security solutions, Darktrace / EMAIL asks who, what, when, where, and why for every single email, and compares it to the pattern of life of both the internal recipient and the external sender, rather than attempting to match patterns with historical threat data. When analyzing an email from an inbound perspective, Darktrace reveals potential deviations from normal, that, when considered sufficiently anomalous, will result in taking a proportional action to the threat assessed.

To illustrate the above, let’s take a look at an example email that Darktrace recently caught.

The following is an email a Darktrace customer received, which Darktrace / EMAIL held before it reached the inbox. In this case, the smuggled Safelink was further obfuscated behind a QR Code. The accompanying document also presented some anomalies in terms of its intent, perceived as a potential social engineering attempt. Finally, the lack of association and low mailing history meant there was no prior context for this email.  

Example of a Safelink Smuggling attack using a popular email security solution’s safelink.
Fig 1: Example of a Safelink Smuggling attack using a popular email security solution’s safelink.

How to mitigate against Safelink Smuggling?

It's difficult for email security vendors to do anything about their links being reused, and reuse should almost be expected by popular operators in the email security space. Therefore, the presence of links from a vendor’s domain in a suspicious email communication rarely indicates a compromise of the link rewrite infrastructure or a compromise of the third-party vendor.

Email security vendors can improve their defense-in-depth, especially around their email provider accounts to avoid Method 1 (Compromised Account attacks) and become more selective with their rewrites to curtail Method 2 (Reply Chain attacks).

Primary protection against Safelink Smuggling should be offered by the email security vendor responsible for inbound email analysis. They need to ensure that techniques such as Safelink Smuggling are not evaded by their detection mechanisms.

Darktrace has long been working on the betterment of security within the email community and innovating our link analysis infrastructure to mitigate against this attack methodology (read more about our major update in 6.2 here), regardless of whether the receiving organization are Darktrace customers.

How does Darktrace deal with Safelink Smuggling today?

Darktrace has been dealing with Safelink Smuggling since launch and has a standardized recommendation for customers who are looking to defend against this threat.

Customers want to avoid being 1) the propagators of this threat and potentially damaging their brand reputation, and 2) being victims of the supply chain attack thereafter.

The principal recommendation to protect customer accounts and consequently their brands is to ensure defense-in-depth. As accounts establish themselves as the crown jewels of any modern enterprise, organizations should vigilantly monitor their account activity with the same rigor they would analyze their network activity. Whether that is through the base account takeover protection offered by Darktrace / EMAIL, or the expanded defense offered by Darktrace / IDENTITY, it is crucial that the accounts themselves have a robust security solution in place.

Secondly, to avoid falling victim to the supply chain attack that leverages a third-party vendor’s link rewrite, it is imperative to use a solution that does not rely on static threat intelligence and link reputation analysis. Rather than chasing attackers by updating rules and signatures, Darktrace leverages Self-Learning AI to learn the communication patterns of both internal and external messages to reveal deviations in both content and context.

Finally, for those customers that already leverage Darktrace / EMAIL we recommend ensuring that lock links are enabled, and that the default warning page is displayed every time a link is rewritten, no matter the perceived severity of the link. This will allow any potential user that clicks on a rewritten Darktrace / EMAIL link to be alerted to the potential nature of the site they are trying to access.

Safelink smuggling example caught by Darktrace

While most cases involve other vendors, analysts recently saw a case where Darktrace's own links were used in this type of attack. A small number of links were leveraged in a campaign targeting both Darktrace and non-Darktrace customers alike. Thankfully, these attempts were all appropriately actioned by those customers that had Darktrace / EMAIL deployed.

In the example below, you will see how Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst describes the example at hand under the Anomaly Indicators section.

Example of Safelink Smuggling attack on Darktrace using the Darktrace Safelink Infrastructure.
Fig 2: Example of Safelink Smuggling attack on Darktrace using the Darktrace Safelink Infrastructure.

First, the display name mismatch can be interpreted as an indicator of social engineering, attempting to deceive the recipient with an IT policy change.

Second, the link itself, which in this case is a hidden redirect to an unusual host for this environment.

Finally, there is a suspected account takeover due to the origin of the email being a long-standing, validated domain that contains a wide variety of suspicious elements.

Darktrace / EMAIL would have held this email from being delivered.

Conclusion

By investigating Safelink Smuggling, Darktrace wants to shine a light on the technique for security teams and help raise awareness of how it can be used to dupe users into lowering their defenses. Challenge your email security vendor on how it deals with link analysis, particularly from trusted senders and applications.

Interested in Darktrace’s approach to defense-in-depth? Check out Darktrace / EMAIL

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Author
Carlos Gray
Product Manager

Carlos Gonzalez Gray is a Product Marketing Manager at Darktrace, based in the Madrid Office. As an email security Subject Matter Expert he collaborates with the global product team to align each product with the company’s ethos and ensures Darktrace are continuously pushing the boundaries of innovation. His prior role at Darktrace was in Sales Engineering, leading the Iberian team and specializing in both the email and OT sectors. Additionally, his prior experience as a consultant to IBEX 35 companies in Spain has made him well-versed in compliance, auditing, and data privacy. Carlos holds an Honors BA in Political Science and a Masters in Cybersecurity from IE University.

Stephen Pickman
Book a 1-1 meeting with one of our experts
Share this article

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

AI

/

March 11, 2025

Survey findings: AI Cyber Threats are a Reality, the People are Acting Now

Default blog imageDefault blog image

Artificial intelligence is changing the cybersecurity field as fast as any other, both on the offensive and defensive side. We surveyed over 1,500 cybersecurity professionals from around the world to uncover their attitudes, understanding, and priorities when it comes to AI cybersecurity in 2025. Our full report, unearthing some telling trends, is out now.

Download the full report to explore these findings in depth

How is AI impacting the threat landscape?

state of ai in cybersecurity report graphic showing ai powered cyber threats having an impact on organizations

Nearly 74% of participants say AI-powered threats are a major challenge for their organization and 90% expect these threats to have a significant impact over the next one to two years, a slight increase from last year. These statistics highlight that AI is not just an emerging risk but a present and evolving one.

As attackers harness AI to automate and scale their operations, security teams must adapt just as quickly. Organizations that fail to prioritize AI-specific security measures risk falling behind, making proactive defense strategies more critical than ever.

Some of the most pressing AI-driven cyber threats include:

  • AI-powered social engineering: Attackers are leveraging AI to craft highly personalized and convincing phishing emails, making them harder to detect and more likely to bypass traditional defenses.
  • More advanced attacks at speed and scale: AI lowers the barrier for less skilled threat actors, allowing them to launch sophisticated attacks with minimal effort.
  • Attacks targeting AI systems: Cybercriminals are increasingly going after AI itself, compromising machine learning models, tampering with training data, and exploiting vulnerabilities in AI-driven applications and APIs.

Safe and secure use of AI

AI is having an effect on the cyber-threat landscape, but it also is starting to impact every aspect of a business – from marketing to HR to operations. The accessibility of AI tools for employees improves workflows, but also poses risks like data privacy violations, shadow AI, and violation of industry regulations.

How are security practitioners accommodating for this uptick in AI use across business?

Among survey participants 45% of security practitioners say they had already established a policy on the safe and secure use of AI and around 50% are in discussions to do so.

While almost all participants acknowledge that this is a topic that needs to be addressed, the gap between discussion and execution could underscore a need for greater insight, stronger leadership commitment, and adaptable security frameworks to keep pace with AI advancements in the workplace. The most popular actions taken are:

  1. Implemented security controls to prevent unwanted exposure of corporate data when using AI technology (67%)
  2. Implemented security controls to protect against other threats/risks associated with using AI technology (62%)

This year specifically, we see further action being taken with the implementation of security controls, training, and oversight.

For a more detailed breakdown that includes results based on industry and organizational size, download the full report here.

AI threats are rising, but security teams still face major challenges

78% of CISOs say AI-powered cyber-threats are already having a significant impact on their organization, a 5% increase from last year.

While cyber professionals feel more prepared for AI powered threats than they did 12 months ago, 45% still say their organization is not adequately prepared—down from 60% last year.

Despite this optimism, key challenges remain, including:

  • A shortage of personnel to manage tools and alerts
  • Gaps in knowledge and skills related to AI-driven countermeasures

Confidence in traditional security tools vs. new AI based tools

This year, 73% of survey participants expressed confidence in their security team’s proficiency in using AI within their tool stack, marking an increase from the previous year.

However, only 50% of participants have confidence in traditional cybersecurity tools to detect and block AI-powered threats. In contrast, 75% of participants are confident in AI-powered security solutions for detecting and blocking such threats and attacks.

As leading organizations continue to implement and optimize their use of AI, they are incorporating it into an increasing number of workflows. This growing familiarity with AI is likely to boost the confidence levels of practitioners even further.

The data indicates a clear trend towards greater reliance on AI-powered security solutions over traditional tools. As organizations become more adept at integrating AI into their operations, their confidence in these advanced technologies grows.

This shift underscores the importance of staying current with AI advancements and ensuring that security teams are well-trained in utilizing these tools effectively. The increasing confidence in AI-driven solutions reflects their potential to enhance cybersecurity measures and better protect against sophisticated threats.

State of AI report

Download the full report to explore these findings in depth

The full report for Darktrace’s State of AI Cybersecurity is out now. Download the paper to dig deeper into these trends, and see how results differ by industry, region, organization size, and job title.  

Continue reading
About the author
The Darktrace Community

Blog

/

Network

/

March 11, 2025

Darktrace's Early Detection of the Latest Ivanti Exploits

Default blog imageDefault blog image

As reported in Darktrace’s 2024 Annual Threat Report, the exploitation of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) in edge infrastructure has consistently been a significant concern across the threat landscape, with internet-facing assets remaining highly attractive to various threat actors.

Back in January 2024, the Darktrace Threat Research team investigated a surge of malicious activity from zero-day vulnerabilities such as those at the time on Ivanti Connect Secure (CS) and Ivanti Policy Secure (PS) appliances. These vulnerabilities were disclosed by Ivanti in January 2024 as CVE-2023-46805 (Authentication bypass vulnerability) and CVE-2024-21887 (Command injection vulnerability), where these two together allowed for unauthenticated, remote code execution (RCE) on vulnerable Ivanti systems.

What are the latest vulnerabilities in Ivanti products?

In early January 2025, two new vulnerabilities were disclosed in Ivanti CS and PS, as well as their Zero Trust Access (ZTA) gateway products.

  • CVE-2025-0282: A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthenticated remote code execution, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the affected system [1]
  • CVE-2025-0283: When combined with CVE-2025-0282, this vulnerability could allow a local authenticated attacker to escalate privileges, gaining higher-level access on the affected system [1]

Ivanti also released a statement noting they are currently not aware of any exploitation of CVE-2025-0283 at the time of disclosure [1].

Darktrace coverage of Ivanti

The Darktrace Threat Research team investigated the new Ivanti vulnerabilities across their customer base and discovered suspicious activity on two customer networks. Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) potentially indicative of successful exploitation of CVE-2025-0282 were identified as early as December 2024, 11 days before they had been publicly disclosed by Ivanti.

Case 1: December 2024

Authentication with a Privileged Credential

Darktrace initially detected suspicious activity connected with the exploitation of CVE-2025-0282 on December 29, 2024, when a customer device was observed logging into the network via SMB using the credential “svc_negbackups”, before authenticating with the credential “svc_negba” via RDP.

This likely represented a threat actor attempting to identify vulnerabilities within the system or application and escalate their privileges from a basic user account to a more privileged one. Darktrace / NETWORK recognized that the credential “svc_negbackups” was new for this device and therefore deemed it suspicious.

Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of the unusual use of a new credential.
Figure 1: Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of the unusual use of a new credential.

Likely Malicious File Download

Shortly after authentication with the privileged credential, Darktrace observed the device performing an SMB write to the C$ share, where a likely malicious executable file, ‘DeElevate64.exe’ was detected. While this is a legitimate Windows file, it can be abused by malicious actors for Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) sideloading, where malicious files are transferred onto other devices before executing malware. There have been external reports indicating that threat actors have utilized this technique when exploiting the Ivanti vulnerabilities [2].

Darktrace’s detection the SMB write of the likely malicious file ‘DeElevate64.exe’ on December 29, 2024.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection the SMB write of the likely malicious file ‘DeElevate64.exe’ on December 29, 2024.

Shortly after, a high volume of SMB login failures using the credential “svc_counteract-ext” was observed, suggesting potential brute forcing activity. The suspicious nature of this activity triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert that was escalated to Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) for further investigation and prompt notification, as the customer was subscribed to the Security Operations Support service.  Enhanced Monitoring are high-fidelity models detect activities that are more likely to be indicative of compromise

Suspicious Scanning and Internal Reconnaissance

Darktrace then went on to observe the device carrying out network scanning activity as well as anomalous ITaskScheduler activity. Threat actors can exploit the task scheduler to facilitate the initial or recurring execution of malicious code by a trusted system process, often with elevated permissions. The same device was also seen carrying out uncommon WMI activity.

Darktrace’s detection of a suspicious network scan from the compromised device.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of a suspicious network scan from the compromised device.

Further information on the suspicious scanning activity retrieved by Cyber AI Analyst, including total number of connections and ports scanned.
Figure 4: Further information on the suspicious scanning activity retrieved by Cyber AI Analyst, including total number of connections and ports scanned.
Darktrace’s detection of a significant spike in WMI activity represented by DCE_RPC protocol request increases at the time, with little to no activity observed one week either side.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of a significant spike in WMI activity represented by DCE_RPC protocol request increases at the time, with little to no activity observed one week either side.

Case 2: January 2025

Suspicious File Downloads

On January 13, 2025, Darktrace began to observe activity related to the exploitation of CVE-2025-0282  on the network of another customer, with one in particular device attempting to download likely malicious files.

Firstly, Darktrace observed the device making a GET request for the file “DeElevator64.dll” hosted on the IP 104.238.130[.]185. The device proceeded to download another file, this time “‘DeElevate64.exe”. from the same IP. This was followed by the download of “DeElevator64.dll”, similar to the case observed in December 2024. External reporting indicates that this DLL has been used by actors exploiting CVE-2025-0282 to sideload backdoor into infected systems [2]

Darktrace’s detection of the download of the suspicious file “DeElevator64.dll” on January 13, 2025.
Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of the download of the suspicious file “DeElevator64.dll” on January 13, 2025.

Suspicious Internal Activity

Just like the previous case, on January 15, the same device was observed making numerous internal connections consistent with network scanning activity, as well as DCE-RPC requests.

Just a few minutes later, Darktrace again detected the use of a new administrative credential, observing the following details:

  • domain=REDACTED hostname=DESKTOP-1JIMIV3 auth_successful=T result=success ntlm_version=2 .

The hostname observed by Darktrace, “DESKTOP-1JIMIV3,” has also been identified by other external vendors and was associated with a remote computer name seen accessing compromised accounts [2].

Darktrace also observed the device performing an SMB write of an additional file, “to.bat,” which may have represented another malicious file loaded from the DLL files that the device had downloaded earlier. It is possible this represented the threat actor attempting to deploy a remote scheduled task.

Darktrace’s detection of SMB Write of the suspicious file “to.bat”.
Figure 7: Darktrace’s detection of SMB Write of the suspicious file “to.bat”.

Further investigation revealed that the device was likely a Veeam server, with its MAC address indicating it was a VMware device. It also appeared that the Veeam server was capturing activities referenced from the hostname DESKTOP-1JIMIV3. This may be analogous to the remote computer name reported by external researchers as accessing accounts [2]. However, this activity might also suggest that while the same threat actor and tools could be involved, they may be targeting a different vulnerability in this instance.

Autonomous Response

In this case, the customer had Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network. As a result, Darktrace was able to contain the compromise and shut down any ongoing suspicious connectivity by blocking internal connections and enforcing a “pattern of life” on the affected device. This action allows a device to make its usual connections while blocking any that deviate from expected behavior. These mitigative actions by Darktrace ensured that the compromise was promptly halted, preventing any further damage to the customer’s environment.

Darktrace's Autonomous Response capability actively mitigating the suspicious internal connectivity.
Figure 8: Darktrace's Autonomous Response capability actively mitigating the suspicious internal connectivity.

Conclusion

If the previous blog in January 2024 was a stark reminder of the threat posed by malicious actors exploiting Internet-facing assets, the recent activities surrounding CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283 emphasize this even further.

Based on the telemetry available to Darktrace, a wide range of malicious activities were identified, including the malicious use of administrative credentials, the download of suspicious files, and network scanning in the cases investigated .

These activities included the download of suspicious files such as “DeElevate64.exe” and “DeElevator64.dll” potentially used by attackers to sideload backdoors into infected systems. The suspicious hostname DESKTOP-1JIMIV3 was also observed and appears to be associated with a remote computer name seen accessing compromised accounts. These activities are far from exhaustive, and many more will undoubtedly be uncovered as threat actors evolve.

Fortunately, Darktrace was able to swiftly detect and respond to suspicious network activity linked to the latest Ivanti vulnerabilities, sometimes even before these vulnerabilities were publicly disclosed.

Credit to: Nahisha Nobregas, Senior Cyber Analyst, Emma Foulger, Principle Cyber Analyst, Ryan Trail, Analyst Content Lead and the Darktrace Threat Research Team

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Case 1

·      Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

·      Compliance / SMB Drive Write

·      Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

·      Device / Network Range Scan

·      Device / Network Scan

·      Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

·      Device / RDP Scan

·      Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

·      Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

·      User / New Admin Credentials on Client

·      User / New Admin Credentials on Server 

Case 2

·      Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

·      Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

·      Compliance / SMB Drive Write

·      Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

·      Device / SMB Lateral Movement

·      Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

·      Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

·      Device / Network Scan

·      Device / RDP Scan

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·      Device / Anomalous ITaskScheduler Activity

·      Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

·      Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

List of IoCs Possible IoCs:

·      DeElevator64.dll

·      deelevator64.dll

·      DeElevate64.exe

·      deelevator64.dll

·      deelevate64.exe

·      to.bat

Mid-high confidence IoCs:

-       104.238.130[.]185

-       http://104.238.130[.]185/DeElevate64.exe

-       http://104.238.130[.]185/DeElevator64.dll

-       DESKTOP-1JIMIV3

References:

1.     https://www.ivanti.com/blog/security-update-ivanti-connect-secure-policy-secure-and-neurons-for-zta-gateways

2.     https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-ivanti-cve-2025-0282-cve-2025-0283/

3.     https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/blog/identity-threat-defense/privilege-escalation-attack#:~:text=In%20this%20approach%2C%20attackers%20exploit,handing%20over%20their%20login%20credentials

Continue reading
About the author
Hugh Turnbull
Cyber Analyst
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI