How Cyber-Attacks Take Down Critical Infrastructure
07
Jul 2021
Cyber-attacks can bypass IT/OT security barriers and threaten your organization's infrastructure. Here's how you can stay protected in today's threat landscape.
Balancing Operational Continuity and Safety in Critical Infrastructure
The recent high-profile attacks against Colonial Pipeline and JBS Foods highlight that operational technology (OT) — the devices that drive gas flows and food processing, along with essentially all other machine-driven physical processes — does not need to be directly targeted in order to be shut down as the result of a cyber-attack.
Indeed, in the Colonial Pipeline incident, the information technology (IT) systems were reportedly compromised, with operations shut down intentionally out of an abundance of caution, that is, so as to not risk the attack spreading to OT and threatening safety. This highlights that threats to both human and environmental safety, along with uncertainty as to the scope of infection, present risk factors for these sensitive industrial environments.
Continuity through availability and integrity
In most countries, critical infrastructure (CI) — ranging from power grids and pipelines to transportation and health care — must maintain continuous activity. The recent ransomware attack against Colonial Pipeline demonstrates why this is the case, where gas shortages due to the compromise led to dangerous panic buys and long lines at the pumps.
Ensuring continuous operation of critical infrastructure requires safeguarding the availability and integrity of machinery. This means that organizations overseeing critical infrastructure must foresee any possible risks and implement systems, procedures, and technologies that mitigate or remove these risks so as to keep their operations running.
Operational demand versus safety
Alongside this requirement for operational continuity, and often in opposition to it, is the requirement for operational safety. These requirements can be in opposition because operational continuity demands that devices remain up and running at all costs, and operational safety demands that humans and the environment be protected at all costs.
Safety measures in critical infrastructure have improved and become increasingly prioritized over the last 50 years following numerous high-profile incidents, such as the Bhopal chemical disaster, the Texas City refinery explosion, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Appropriate safety precautions could have likely prevented these incidents, but at the expense of operational continuity.
Consequently, administrators of critical infrastructure have to balance the very real threat that an incident may pose to both human life and the environment with the demand to remain operational at all times. More often than not, the final decision regarding what constitutes an acceptable risk is determined by budgets and cost-benefit analyses.
Cyber-attack: A rising risk profile for critical infrastructure
In 2010, the discovery of the Stuxnet malware — which resulted in a nuclear facility in Iran having its centrifuges ruined via compromised programmable logic controllers (PLCs) — demonstrated that critical infrastructure could be targeted by a cyber-attack.
At the time of Stuxnet, critical infrastructure industries used computers designed to ensure operational continuity with little regard for cyber security, as at the time the risk of a cyber-attack seemed either non-existent or vanishingly low. Since then, a number of attacks targeting industrial environments that have emerged on the global threat landscape.
Figure 1: An overview of distinctive methods used in attacks against industrial environments
Classic strains of industrial malware, such as Stuxnet, Triton, and Industroyer, have historically been installed via removable media, such as USB. This is because OT networks are traditionally segregated from the Internet in what is known as an ‘air gap.’ And this remains a prevalent vector of attack, with a study recently finding that cyber-threats installed via USB and other external media doubled in 2021, with 79% of these holding the potential to disrupt OT.
In many ways, operational demands in the subsequent 10 years have made critical infrastructure even more vulnerable. These include the convergence of information technology and operational technology (IT/OT convergence), the adoption of devices in the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), and the deprecation of manual back-up systems. This means that OT can be disrupted by cyber-attacks that first target IT systems, rather than having to be installed manually via external media.
At the same time, recent government initiatives — such as the Department of Energy’s 100-day ‘cyber sprint’ to protect electricity operations and President Biden’s Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity — and regulatory frameworks and directives such as the EU’s NIS directive have either encouraged or mandated that critical infrastructure industries start addressing this new risk.
With the severe and persistent threat that cyber-attacks pose to critical infrastructure, including maritime cybersecurity, and the increasing calls to address the issue, the question remains as to how to best achieve robust cyber defense.
Assessing the risk
To claim administrators of critical infrastructure are ignorant or oblivious to the threat posed by cyber-attacks would be unfair. Many organizations have implemented changes to mitigate or remove the risk either as a result of regulation or their own forward thinking.
However, these projects can take years, even decades. High costs and ever-changing operational demand also mean that these projects may never fully remove the risk.
As a result, many operators may understand the threat of a cyber-attack but not be in a position to do anything about it in the short or medium term. Instead, procedures have to be put in place to minimize risk even if this threatens operational continuity.
For example, a risk assessment may decide it is best to shut down all OT operations in the event of a cyber-attack in order to avoid a major accident. This abundance of caution is forced upon operators, who do not have the ability to immediately confirm the boundaries of a compromise. The prevalence of cyber insurance provides this option with further appeal. Any losses incurred by stopping operations can theoretically be recouped and the risk is therefore transferred.
While the full details of the Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident are still to be determined, the sequence of events outlined below provides a plausible explanation for how a cyber-attack could take down critical infrastructure, even when that cyber-attack does not reach or even target OT systems. Indeed, the CEO of Colonial Pipeline, in a testimony to congress, confirmed “the imperative to isolate and contain the attack to help ensure the malware did not spread to the operational technology network, which controls our pipeline operations, if it had not already.”
Figure 2: A sequence of events which may lead to critical infrastructure being shut down by a cyber-attack, even when that cyber-attack doesn’t directly impact OT networks
The limits of securing IT or OT in isolation
The emergence of OT cyber security solutions in the last five years demonstrates that critical infrastructure industries are trying to find a way to address the risks posed by cyber-attacks. But these solutions have limited scope, as they assume IT and OT are separated and use legacy security techniques such as malware signatures and patch management.
The 2021 SANS ICS Security Summit highlighted how the OT security community suffers from a lack of visibility in knowing and understanding their networks. For many organizations, simply determining whether an unusual incident is an attack or the result of a software error is a challenge.
Given that most OT cyber-attacks actually start in IT networks before pivoting into OT, investing in an IT security solution rather than an OT-specific solution may at first seem like a better business decision. But IT solutions fall short if an attacker successfully pivots into the OT network, or if the attacker is a rogue insider who already has direct access to the OT network. A siloed approach to securing either IT or OT in isolation will thus fall short of the full scope needed to safeguard industrial systems.
It is clear that a mature security posture for critical infrastructure would include security solutions for both IT and OT. Even then, using separate solutions to protect the IT and OT networks is limited, as it presents challenges when defending network boundaries and detecting incidents when an attacker pivots from IT to OT. Under time pressure, a security team does not want changes in visibility, detection, language or interface while trying to determine whether a threat crossed the ‘boundary’ between IT and OT.
Separate solutions can also make detecting an attacker abusing traditional IT attack TTPs within an OT network much harder if the security team is relying on a purely OT solution to defend the OT environment. Examples of this include the abuse of IT remote management tools to affect industrial environments, such as in the suspected cyber-attack at the Florida water facility earlier this year. Cybersecurity for utilities is becoming increasingly important as these sectors face growing cyber threats that can disrupt essential services.
Using AI to minimize cyber risk and maximize cyber safety
In contrast, Darktrace AI is able to defend an entire cyber ecosystem estate, building a ‘pattern of life’ across IT and OT, as well as the points at which they converge. Consequently, cyber security teams can use a single pane of glass to detect and respond to cyber-attacks as they emerge and develop, regardless of where they are in the environment.
Use cases for Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI include containing pre-existing threats to maintain continuous operations. This was seen when Darktrace’s AI detected pre-existing infections and acted autonomously to contain the threat, allowing the operator to leave infected IIoT devices active while waiting for replacements. Darktrace can also thwart ransomware in IT before it can spread into OT, as when Darktrace detected a ransomware attack targeting a supplier for critical infrastructure in North America at its earliest stages.
Darktrace’s unified protection, including visibility and early detection of zero-days, empowers security teams to overcome uncertainty and make a confident decision not to shut down operations. Darktrace has already demonstrated this ability in the wild, and allows organizations to understand normal machine and human behavior in order to enforce this behavior, even in the face of an emerging cyber-attack.
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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Author
Oakley Cox
Director of Product
Oakley is a Product Manager within the Darktrace R&D team. He collaborates with global customers, including all critical infrastructure sectors and Government agencies, to ensure Darktrace/OT remains the first in class solution for OT Cyber Security. He draws on 7 years’ experience as a Cyber Security Consultant to organizations across EMEA, APAC and ANZ. His research into cyber-physical security has been published by Cyber Security journals and by CISA. Oakley has a Doctorate (PhD) from the University of Oxford.
With the perimeter all but dissolved, Network Detection and Response (NDR) tools are quickly becoming a critical component of the security stack, as the main tool to span the modern network. NDRs connect on-premises infrastructure to cloud, remote workers, identities, SaaS applications, and IoT/OT – something not available to EDR that requires agents and isolates visibility to individual devices.
KuppingerCole Analysts AG designated Darktrace an ‘Overall Leader’ position because of our continual innovation around user-led security. Self-Learning AI together with automated triage through Cyber AI Analyst and real-time autonomous response actions have been instrumental to security teams in stopping potential threats before they become a breach. With this time saved, Darktrace is leading beyond reactive security to truly harden a network, allowing the team to spend more time in preventive security measures.
Network Detection and Response protects where others fail to reach
NDR solutions operate at the network level, deploying inside or parallel to your network to ingest raw traffic via virtual or physical sensors. This gives them unprecedented potential to identify anomalies and possible breaches in any network - far beyond simple on-prem, into dynamic virtual environments, cloud or hybrid networks, cloud applications, and even remote devices accessing the corporate network via ZTNA or VPN.
Rather than looking at processes level data, NDR can detect the lateral movement of an adversary across multiple assets by analyzing network traffic patterns which endpoint solutions may not be able to identify [1]. In the face of a growing, complex environment, organizations large and small, will benefit from using NDRs either in conjunction, or as the foundation for, their Extended Detection and Response (XDR) for a unified view that improves their overall threat detection, ease of investigation and faster response times.
Today's NDR solutions are expected to include advanced ML and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms [1]
Traditional IDS & IPS systems are labor intensive, requiring continuous rule creation, outdated signature maintenance, and manual monitoring for false positives or incorrect actions. This is no longer viable against a higher volume and changing landscape, making NDR the natural network tool to level against these evolutions. The role of AI in NDRs is designed to meet this challenge, “to reduce both the labor need for analysis and false positives, as well as add value by improving anomaly detection and overall security posture” .
Celebrating success in leadership and innovation
Darktrace is proud to have been recognized as an NDR “Overall Leader” in KuppingerCole Analyst AG’s Leadership Compass. The report gave further recognition to Darktrace as a ‘Product Leader”, “Innovation Leader” and “Market Leader”.
Maximum scores were received for core product categories, in addition to market presence and financial strength. Particular attention was directed to our innovation. This year has seen several NDR updates via Darktrace’s ActiveAI Security Platform version 6.2 which has enhanced investigation workflows and provided new AI transparency within the toolset.
Positive scores were also received for Darktrace’s deployment ecosystem and surrounding support, minimizing the need for extraneous integrations through a unique platform architecture that connects with over 90 other vendors.
Figure 1: High Scores received in Darktrace’s KuppingerCole Spider Chart across Core NDR capability areas
Darktrace’s pioneering AI approach sets it apart
Darktrace / NETWORK’s approach is fundamentally different to other NDRs. Continual anomaly-based detection (our Self-Learning AI), understands what is normal across each of your network entities, and then examines deviations from these behaviors rather than needing to apply static rules or ML to adversary techniques. As a result, Darktrace / NETWORK can focus on surfacing the novel threats that cannot be anticipated, whilst our proactive solutions expose gaps that can be exploited and reduce the risk of known threats.
Across the millions of possible network events that may occur, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst reduces that manual workload for SOC teams by presenting only what is most important in complete collated incidents. This accelerates SOC Level 2 analyses of incidents by 10x2, giving time back, first for any necessary response and then for preventive workflows.
Finally, when incidents begin to escalate, Darktrace can natively (or via third-party) autonomously respond and take precise actions based on a contextual understanding of both the affected assets and incident in question so that threats can be disarmed without impacting wider operations.
Within the KuppingerCole report, several standout strengths were listed:
Cyber AI Analyst was celebrated as a core differentiator, enhancing both visibility and investigation into critical network issues and allowing a faster response.
Darktrace / NETWORK was singled for its user benefits. Both a clear interface for analysts with advanced filtering and analytical tools, and efficient role-based access control (RBAC) and configuration options for administrators.
At the product level, Darktrace was recognized for complete network traffic analysis (NTA) capabilities allowing extensive analysis into components like application use/type, fingerprinting, source/destination communication, in addition to comprehensive protocol support across a range of network device types from IT, OT, IoT and mobiles and detailed MITRE ATT&CK mapping.
Finally, at the heart of it, Darktrace’s innovation was highlighted in relation to its intrinsic Self Learning AI, utilizing multiple layers of deep learning, neural networks, LLMs, NLP, Generative AI and more to understand network activity and filter it for what’s critical on an individual customer level.
Going beyond reactive security
Darktrace’s visibility and AI-enabled detection, investigation and response enable security teams to focus on hardening gaps in their network through contextual relevance & priority. Darktrace / NETWORK explicitly gives time back to security teams allowing them to focus on the bigger strategic and governance workflows that sometimes get overlooked. This is enabled through proactive solutions intrinsically connected to our NDR:
Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management, which looks beyond just CVE risks to instead discover, prioritize and validate risks by business impact and how to mobilize against them early, to reduce the number of real threats security teams face.
Darktrace / Incident Readiness & Recovery, a solution rather than service-based approach to incident response (IR) that lets teams respond in the best way to each incident and proactively test their familiarity and effectiveness of IR workflows with sophisticated incident simulations involving their own analysts and assets.
Together, these solutions allow Darktrace / NETWORK to go beyond the traditional NDR and shift teams to a more hardened and proactive state.
Putting customers first
Customers continue to sit at the forefront of Darktrace R&D, with their emerging needs and pain points being the direct inspiration for our continued innovation.
This year Darktrace / NETWORK has protected thousands of customers against the latest attacks, from data exfil and destruction, to unapproved privilege escalation and ransomware including strains like Medusa, Qilin and AlphV BlackCat.
In each instance, Darktrace / NETWORK was able to provide a holistic lens of the anomalies present in their traffic, collated those that were important, and either responded or gave teams the ability to take targeted actions against their threats – even when adversaries pivoted. In one example of a Gootloader compromise, Darktrace ensured a SOC went from detection to recovery within 5 days, 92.8% faster than the average containment time of 69 days.
Results like these, focused on user-led security, have secured Darktrace’s position within the latest NDR Leadership Compass.
From Royal to BlackSuit: Understanding the Tactics and Impact of a Sophisticated Ransomware Strain
What is BlackSuit Ransomware?
Since late 2023, Darktrace has detected BlackSuit ransomware infiltrating multiple customer networks in the US. This ransomware has targeted a wide range of industries, including arts, entertainment, real estate, public administration, defense, and social security.
Emerging in May 2023, BlackSuit is believed to be a spinoff of Royal ransomware due to similarities in code and Conti, and most likely consists of Russian and Eastern European hackers [1]. Recorded Future reported that the ransomware had affected 95 organizations worldwide, though the actual number is likely much higher [2]. While BlackSuit does not appear to focus on any particular sector, it has targeted multiple organizations in the healthcare, education, IT, government, retail and manufacturing industries [3]. Employing double extortion tactics, BlackSuit not only encrypts files but also steals sensitive data to leverage ransom payments.
BlackSuit has demanded over USD 500 million in ransoms, with the highest individual demand reaching USD 60 million [4]. Notable targets include CDK Global, Japanese media conglomerate Kadokawa, multiple educational institutions, Octapharma Plasma, and the government of Brazil [5][6][7][8].
Darktrace’s Coverage of BlackSuit Ransomware Attack
Case 1, November 2023
The earliest attack on a Darktrace customer by BlackSuit was detected at the start of November 2023. The unusual network activity began on a weekend—a time commonly chosen by ransomware groups to increase their chances of success, as many security teams operate with reduced staff. Darktrace identified indicators of the attackers’ presence on the network for almost two weeks, during which a total of 15 devices exhibited suspicious behavior.
The attack commenced with unusual internal SMB (Server Message Block) connections using a compromised service account. An internal device uploaded an executable (zzza.exe) to a domain controller (DC) and shortly after, wrote a script (socks5.ps1) to another device. According to a Cybersecurity Advisory from the CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, US), the script file was a PowerShell reverse proxy [9].
Approximately an hour and a half later, the device to which the script was written exhibited uncommon WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) activity. Two hours after receiving the executable file, the DC was observed making an outgoing NTLM request, using PowerShell to remotely execute commands, distributing differently named executable files (<PART OF THE CUSTOMER’S NAME>.exe), and controlling services on other devices.
Eighteen hours after the start of the unusual activity, Darktrace detected another device making repeated connections to “mystuff.bublup[.]com”, which the aforementioned CISA Advisory identifies as a domain used by BlackSuit for data exfiltration [9].
About ten minutes after the suspicious executables were distributed across the network, and less than 24 hours after the start of the unusual activity, file encryption began. A total of ten devices were seen appending the “.blacksuit” extension to files saved on other devices using SMB, as well as writing ransom notes (readme.blacksuit.txt). The file encryption lasted less than 20 minutes.
Figure 1: An example of the contents of a BlackSuit ransom note being written over SMB.
During this compromise, external connections to endpoints related to ConnectWise’s ScreenConnect remote management tool were also seen from multiple servers, suggesting that the tool was likely being abused for command-and-control (C2) activity. Darktrace identified anomalous connectivity associated with ScreenConnect was seen up to 11 days after the start of the attack.
10 days after the start of the compromise, an account belonging to a manager was detected adding “.blacksuit” extensions to the customer’s Software-a-Service (SaaS) resources while connecting from 173.251.109[.]106. Six minutes after file encryption began, Darktrace flagged the unusual activity and recommended a block. However, since Autonomous Response mode was not enabled, the customer’s security team needed to manually confirm the action. Consequently, suspicious activity continued for about a week after the initial encryption. This included disabling authentication on the account and an unusual Teams session initiated from the suspicious external endpoint 216.151.180[.]147.
Case 2, February 2024
Another BlackSuit compromise occurred at the start of February 2024, when Darktrace identified approximately 50 devices exhibiting ransomware-related activity in another US customer’s environment. Further investigation revealed that a significant number of additional devices had also been compromised. These devices were outside Darktrace’s purview to the customer’s specific deployment configuration. The threat actors managed to exfiltrate around 4 TB of data.
Initial access to the network was gained via a virtual private network (VPN) compromise in January 2024, when suspicious connections from a Romanian IP address were detected. According to CISA, the BlackSuit group often utilizes the services of initial access brokers (IAB)—actors who specialize in infiltrating networks, such as through VPNs, and then selling that unauthorized access to other threat actors [9]. Other initial access vectors include phishing emails, RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) compromise, and exploitation of vulnerable public-facing applications.
Similar to the first case, the file encryption began at the end of the working week. During this phase of the attack, affected devices were observed encrypting files on other internal devices using two compromised administrator accounts. The encryption activity lasted for approximately six and a half hours. Multiple alerts were sent to the customer from Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) team, who began reviewing the activity within four minutes of the start of the file encryption.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst clustering together multiple events related to unusual activity on the network, including file encryption over SMB by BlackSuit.
Figure 3: A spike in model alerts on the day when file encryption by BlackSuit was observed in the network.
In this case, the threat actor utilized SystemBC proxy malware for command and control (C2). A domain controller (DC) was seen connecting to 137.220.61[.]94 on the same day the file encryption took place. The DC was also observed connecting to a ProxyScrape domain around the same time, which is related to the SOCKS5 protocol used by SystemBC. During this compromise, RDP, SSH, and SMB were used for lateral movement within the network.
Figure 4: A Cyber AI Analyst investigation alerting to a device on the VPN subnet making suspicious internal SSH connections due to malicious actors moving laterally within the network.
Signs of threat actors potentially being on the network were observed as early as two days prior to the file encryption. This included unusual internal network scanning via multiple protocols (ICMP, SMB, RDP, etc.), credential brute-forcing, SMB access failures, and anonymous SMBv1 sessions. These activities were traced to IP addresses belonging to two desktop devices in the VPN subnet associated with two regular employee user accounts. Threat actors were seemingly able to exploit at least one of these accounts due to LDAP legacy policies being in place on the customer’s environment.
Figure 5: A Cyber AI Analyst incident summary alerting to a device on the VPN subnet conducting internal reconnaissance.
Figure 6: Examples of the proposed Darktrace Autonomous Response actions on the day BlackSuit initiated file encryption.
Case 3, August 2024
The most recently observed BlackSuit compromise occurred in August 2024, when a device was observed attempting to brute-force the credentials of an IT administrator. This activity continued for 11 days.
Once the admin’s account was successfully compromised, network scanning, unusual WMI, and SAMR (Security Account Manager Remote protocol) activity followed. A spike in the use of this account was detected on a Sunday—once again, the attackers seemingly targeting the weekend—when the account was used by nearly 50 different devices.
The compromised admin’s account was exploited for data gathering via SMB, resulting in the movement of 200 GB of data between internal devices in preparation for exfiltration. The files were then archived using the naming convention “*.part<number>.rar”.
Around the same time, Darktrace observed data transfers from 19 internal devices to “bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com,” totaling just over 200 GB—the same volume of data gathered internally. Connections to other Bublup domains were also detected. The internal data download and external data transfer activity took approximately 8-9 hours.
Unfortunately, Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode at the time of the attack, meaning any mitigative actions to stop the data gathering or exfiltration required human confirmation.
Figure 7: One of the compromised devices was seen sending 80 GB of data to bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com within a span of 4 hours.
Once the information was stolen, the threat actor moved on to the final stage of the attack—file encryption. Five internal devices, using either the compromised admin account or connecting via anonymous SMBv1 sessions, were seen encrypting files and writing ransom notes to five other devices on the network. The attempts at file encryption continued for around two hours, but Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was able to block the activity and prevent the attack from escalating.
Conclusion
The persistent and evolving threat posed by ransomware like BlackSuit underscores the critical importance of robust cybersecurity measures across all sectors. Since its emergence in 2023, BlackSuit has demonstrated a sophisticated approach to infiltrating networks, leveraging double extortion tactics, and demanding substantial ransoms. The cases highlighted above illustrate the varied methods and persistence of BlackSuit attackers, from exploiting VPN vulnerabilities to abusing remote management tools and targeting off-hours to maximize impact.
Although many similar connection patterns, such as the abuse of Bublup services for data exfiltration or the use of SOCKS5 proxies for C2, were observed during cases investigated by Darktrace, BlackSuit actors are highly sophisticated and tailors their attacks to each target organization. The consequences of a successful attack can be highly disruptive, and remediation efforts can be time-consuming and costly. This includes taking the entire network offline while responding to the incident, restoring encrypted files from backups (if available), dealing with damage to the organization’s reputation, and potential lawsuits.
These BlackSuit ransomware incidents emphasize the need for continuous vigilance, timely updates to security protocols, and the adoption of autonomous response technologies to swiftly counteract such attacks. As ransomware tactics continue to evolve, organizations must remain agile and informed to protect their critical assets and data. By learning from these incidents and enhancing their cybersecurity frameworks, organizations can better defend against the relentless threat of ransomware and ensure the resilience of their operations in an increasingly digital world.
Credit to Signe Zaharka (Principal Cyber Analyst) and Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Darktrace’s First 6: Half-Year Threat Report 2024 highlights the latest attack trends and key threats observed by the Darktrace Threat Research team in the first six months of 2024.
Focuses on anomaly detection and behavioral analysis to identify threats
Maps mitigated cases to known, publicly attributed threats for deeper context
Offers guidance on improving security posture to defend against persistent threats
Appendices
Darktrace Model Detections
Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control
Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Outgoing
Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device
Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Unusual SMB
Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion
.blacksuit - File extension – When encrypting the files, this extension is appended to the filename – High
readme.blacksuit.txt – ransom note - A file demanding cryptocurrency payment in exchange for decrypting the victim's files and not leaking the stolen data – High
mystuff.bublup[.]com, bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com – data exfiltration domains related to an organization and project management app that has document sharing functionality – High
137.220.61[.]94:4001 – SystemBC C2 related IP address (this tool is often used by other ransomware groups as well) - Medium
173.251.109[.]106 – IP address seen during a SaaS BlackSuit compromise (during file encryption) – Medium
216.151.180[.]147 – IP address seen during a SaaS BlackSuit compromise (during an unusual Teams session) - Medium
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Tactic - Technqiue
Account Manipulation - PERSISTENCE - T1098
Alarm Suppression - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0878
Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071
Automated Collection - COLLECTION - T1119
Block Command Message - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0803
Block Reporting Message - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0804
![One of the compromised devices was seen sending 80 GB of data to bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com within a span of 4 hours.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/673513f1135d0e009caf256f_6735136a725738f4afe4de2b_Fig%25207.png)
